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THE ADEQUACY OF ETHIOPIA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
Wakgari Kebeta Djigsa 
Abstract 
States have the sovereign right to regulate investment activities within their territories to 
cope up with various policy objectives. One of such areas where regulation is necessitated 
is the protection of the host State’s society and the environment. This article aims at 
elucidating how to strike a balance between the protection of the foreign investment and 
the protection of the environment under Ethiopia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). 
Though a comparative doctrinal investigation, this piece finds that the BITs of Ethiopia 
accord various protections to investments of foreign investors but they do not impose 
adequate obligations on the investors concerning environmental protection. It comes 
across the need to adopt a holistic approach of reforming the BITs from the preambles to 
the substantive contents. In order to safeguard Ethiopia’s right to regulate, the preambles, 
the fair and equitable treatment (FET) and indirect expropriation provisions of the BITs 
should be reconsidered. For this to happen, a resort to amendment, termination and 
renegotiation of the agreements would be a way-out. Thus, new generation of BITs is 
needed to introduce a bottom-up approach and ensure sustainable development. 
Keywords: Bilateral investment treaties (BIT), environment, Ethiopia, fair and equitable 
treatment, foreign direct investment (FDI), regulatory space 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The current international economic relationship among States is characterized by massive 
cross-border flow of capital paving ways through which foreign nationals could directly invest 
their finance in other States. This type of capital flow, referred to as Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), often takes place between capital exporting and capital importing countries. The effect of 
FDI in the state which hosts the investment is multifarious. For instance, it has the potential to 
contribute to the economic growth and development of the state. A properly regulated FDI can 
provide developing countries with foreign capital; new jobs; new and improved technology and 
management practices; increased domestic production, more developed and diversified domestic 
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markets, stronger institutional capacity and less dependency on foreign aid and external debt to 
promote poverty reduction and other development initiatives.1 Contrary to this, loosely regulated 
FDI causes pollution, land degradation, climate change and thereby causing harm to the society 
and the environment. As a matter of fact, the wastes that industrial plants release threatens the 
human, animal, and plant life and safety. Investors may also bring obsolete technologies which 
can endanger the environment and life in the host state.2  
The inward flow of FDI into Ethiopia is increasing rapidly and the country’s economy is in 
transition.3 Ethiopia has concluded dozens of BITs for the promotion and reciprocal protection of 
the investments.4 These BITs are concluded hoping that they will contribute to the development 
of the country. Over the past few years, industrial activities in Ethiopia are attracting attention of 
not only the local communities but also of the government because of their harm to the society 
and the environment. In light of this, it is important to consider the extent to which the existing 
BITs of Ethiopia support the imposition of measures to protect the environment when the 
environment is harmed as a result of FDI. This, however, is not to mean that domestic 
investments do not harm the environment. Rather, the application of BITs unduly restricts 
regulatory space and causing a regulatory chill on socially desirable action.5 
The Ethiopian Constitution6 explicitly provides that the people of Ethiopia have the right to 
improved living standards and to sustainable development.7 It goes on saying that all 
international agreements and relations to which Ethiopia is a party shall ensure the country’s 
right to sustainable development.8 Within the ambit of this sub paragraph falls the BITs 
concluded by Ethiopia. Accordingly, it is a must that Ethiopian BITs be consistent with the 
notion of sustainable development. The Constitution also declares that “all persons have the right 
to a clean and healthy environment.”9 Ethiopia has also adopted various legislations, policies and 
strategies in this regard.10  Furthermore, the country has become a party to numerous Multilateral 
                                                          
1 Genevieve Fox, A Future for International Investment? Modifying BITs to Drive Economic Development, 46 
GEORGETOWN J INT’L L. 229, 234-235 (2014). 
2 M SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 109-110 (3rd edn, Cambridge University 
Press) (2010). 
3 National Planning Commission, The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20), 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2015, at 14. 
4 So far, Ethiopia has concluded a total of thirty three BITs for the promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments. See UNCTAD page, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/67. (Accessed 
on 28th of October 2017). Out of these, only twenty one BITs are in force. These are those signed with Algeria, 
Austria, China, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Finland, France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. 
5 See e.g. UNCHR, ‘Human Rights, Trade and Investment,’ UN doc E/CN.4/Sub.2//2003/9 (2003). 
6 The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 1/1995, FEDERAL NEGARIT 
GAZETTE, 1st Year No.1, 1995 (hereafter FDRE CONSTITUTION). 
7 Id. Art. 43 (1). According to the World Commission on Environment and Development definition of 
sustainable development of 1987, “sustainable development is a development which meets the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” WORLD COMMISSION 
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. OUR COMMON FUTURE. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1987) 
8 Id. sub para. 3.  
9 Id. Art. 44 (1).  
10 E.g. Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation No. 300/2002, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 9th Year No. 
12, Addis Ababa, 3rd December, 2002; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green 
Economy, Green economy strategy, Addis Ababa, 2011. 
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Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that strive to ensure sustainable development through 
environmental protection.11 
Against this backdrop, this article aims at examining how to strike a balance between the 
protections of FDI and Ethiopia’s right and duty to impose regulatory measures to protect the 
environment through BITs. By using comparative and doctrinal analysis, this piece assesses the 
approaches of inculcating environment-friendly provisions into BITs and identifies the best 
experiences of other jurisprudences and creating a new roadmap for new generation of BITs. The 
legal analysis part is corroborated with cases rendered at different tribunals. The BITs Ethiopia 
has signed with other countries are analyzed through an explorative critical review approach. In 
the comparative part, IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development) Model 
Agreement, Indian Model BIT, SADC (South African Development Community) Model BIT, 
and BITs agreements from different jurisdiction, most importantly signed between developed 
and developing countries are considered.  
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows. Section II presents the general 
overview of BITs. Based on model agreement and comparative experience, Section III examines 
how environmental regulatory spaces are opened up within BITs frameworks. Adequacy of 
policy space under Ethiopian BITs towards the protection of the environment are analyzed under 
Section IV. Finally, section V comes up with conclusion and the way forward. 
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
A. Nature, Structure and Scope 
Bilateral investment treaties are International Investment Agreements (IIAs) entered into 
between two countries that are designed to establish rules and enforcement mechanisms 
governing foreign investment between the state parties and their nationals.12 BITs usually 
constitute a title, preamble, definition of terms, the rights and duties of the Parties, standards of 
protections and dispute settlement mechanisms. IIAs in general and BITs in particular have used 
to concentrate on the protection and promotion of foreign investments. But in recent years, the 
protection of the environment and other public policy objectives are emerging as one of the most 
serious contemporary issues of the international investment legal regime.13 Given the binding 
nature of their dispute settlement mechanisms, IIAs have a key role in supporting the protection 
of the environment that is essential for our economies and for sustainable development.14 In 
                                                          
11 Ethiopia is Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to mention few.  
12 Fox, supra note 1, at 229. 
13 Won Kidane and Weidong Zhu, China-Africa Investment Treaties: Old Rules, New Challenges, 37 FORDHAM I 
L J, 4 (1034), 1067 (2014). 
14 United Nations Environment Programme, UNCTAD Conference on International Investment Agreements and 
Sustainable Development: UNEP Statement on IIAs delivered by Anja von Moltke 16.3.2016, available at 
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Statement-UNEP.pdf. (accessed on  3rd of 
November 2016).  
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particular, IIAs can be used to properly define how the treaty partners balance investor protection 
with other public policy objectives.15  
Nevertheless, investment treaties of our time are more of mechanisms through which a small 
and typically powerful set of private actors can change the substantive content of the law outside 
the normal domestic legislative and judicial frameworks.16 In order to tackle this problem, BITs 
need to be reconstructed to accommodate both private and public interests. In this regard, one 
may question whether capital importing countries have the leverage to influence the capital 
exporting countries in determining the terms and conditions of BITs. This has a lot to do with the 
bargaining power of the Parties while making the treaties. In addition, capital importing nations 
need to be selective enough when potential investments tend to override public interests. This 
way, it is possible to reform and extend the scope of the current BITs. 
B. Provisions of BITs with Repercussions on Environmental Protection and the 
Jurisprudence 
This subsection aims at discussing specific provisions of BITs having implications for the 
protection of the environment. The discussion is further corroborated by the arbitral awards of 
investment arbitration tribunals. 
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) 
The FET standard requires the host State to accord a ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to the 
investments of foreign investors. This standard of protection of foreign investment remains a 
controversial standard of treatment under IIAs. The concept of FET is more of uncertainty 
because the notions of fairness and equity do not connote a clear set of legal prescriptions in 
international investment law and allow for a significant degree of subjective judgment paving 
ways for foreign investors to bypass domestic laws and other regulatory measures.17 The Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines fair as “impartial, just, equitable, and disinterested”.18 An important 
element that tribunals have considered in determining whether there was a violation of the FET 
standard is the notion of the legitimate expectations of the investor. Some tribunals have read an 
extensive list of disciplines into the FET clause, which are taxing on any state, but especially on 
developing and least-developed countries; lack of clarity persists regarding the appropriate 
threshold of liability.19 
                                                          
15 Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: A 
Survey, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, OECD Publishing, (2011), at 7.  
16 Lise Johnson and Oleksandr Volkov, State Liability for Regulatory Change: How International Investment 
Rules are Overriding Domestic Law, (2014), at 1. Available at https://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/01/06/state-liability-
for-regulatory-change-how-international-investment-rules-are-overriding-domestic-law/.(accessed on 2nd of 
November 2016).  
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development, 2015. Available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/INVESTMENT%20POLICY%20FRAMEWORK%2020
15%20WEB_VERSION.pdf. (Accessed on 10th of January 2017).  (UNCTAD 2015 hereafter). 
18 BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 8th ed. (2004). 
19 UNCTAD, supra note 17.  
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In Tecmed v Mexico, concerning the revocation of a license for the operation of a landfill, 
the tribunal reasoned that: 
The FET standard of treatment, in light of the good faith principle established by 
international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act 
in a consistent manner… so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations 
that will govern its investments…20 
Some tribunals have explicitly ruled that a breach of legitimate expectations may happen even 
where the host State is acting in the good faith pursuit of a legitimate regulatory measure. In 
Enron v. Argentina, the tribunal noted that FET is desirable to maintain a stable framework for 
the investment and concluded that a key element of FET is the requirement of a “stable 
framework for the investment.”21 The same tribunal added that legitimate expectations are 
derived from the conditions that were offered by the State to the investor at the time of the 
investment and that such conditions were relied upon by the investor when deciding to invest.22 
It further established that the principle of good faith is not an essential element of the FET 
standard and therefore violation of the standard would not require the existence of bad faith on 
the part of the host State.23  
Other tribunals also ruled that if the legal framework governing the investment changes in a 
way that was not anticipated by the investor at the time of making the investment, then the 
investor should be compensated for the cost of complying with those changes.24 This means that 
if a new law is adopted, or an existing law is changed or applied in a new way,25 those changes 
can trigger state liability. Moreover, onerous levels of compensation awarded to investors could 
preclude poorer states from taking effective measures to give effect to their international 
obligations to protect their environmental patrimony since they will often not be in a position to 
finance interference.26 
Thus, the use of FET to protect investors’ legitimate expectations can indirectly restrict 
countries’ ability to change investment-related policies or to introduce new policies including 
those for the public good that may have a negative impact on individual foreign investors.27 FET 
                                                          
20 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2) Award, 
29 May 2003, para. 154. 
21 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 
May 22, 2007. Paras. 259 & 260. 
22 Id. para 262.  
23 Id. para 263.  
24 See, e.g., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, July 30, 2010, para. 207; Total v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, Dec. 27, 2010, para. 122. 
25 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, July 1, 
2004. 
26 Luke E. Peterson and Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2003), at 31. Available at 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf. (Accessed on 2nd of November 2016).  
27 UNCTAD, supra note 17. 
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protections can, under some treaties, extend to subsequent actions of the state, for example 
changes in laws or regulations, withdrawals of essential licenses, imposition of new duties or 
export quota or similar.28 This type of FET is evident from those treaties which use broad 
connotations without qualifying the standard of treatment. This, in turn, results in extensive 
subjectivity in the course of interpretation of the FET by arbitral tribunals. Those BITs which 
recognize qualified FET and those which omit the FET standard play a vital role in minimizing 
this unnecessary subjectivity.  
At this juncture, it is important to reiterate that BITs usually contain adequate provisions that 
protect foreign investors against opportunistic intervention by the host states and that the notion 
of legitimate expectations is improperly used by investors to acquire unjust benefits. It is not 
uncommon to see the following six core investor protection provisions in BITs: 
(1) right to national and most-favored-nation treatments; (2) protection against 
expropriation, and fair, prompt, and adequate compensation when it happens; (3) right to 
repatriate capital and investment proceeds; (4) limitations on performance requirements; 
(5) access to international arbitration in the event of a dispute; and (6) authority to select 
top managerial personnel of their choice.29 
It is also vital to note that the host states are duty bound to protect the legitimate expectation of 
investors. However, any interest invoked by foreign investors shall not be protected to the extent 
it impairs the ability of the host state to comply with its obligation to protect the environment 
under domestic laws and international agreements. This necessitates to draw a boundary between 
the genuine mistreatment of foreign investments that should be outlawed by the FET standard 
and measures of host states taken in pursuance of legitimate policies that cannot be held in 
breach of the standard, even where such measures harm foreign investments.30 BITs can be used 
to set criteria for ensuring a proper balance between the interests of investors and host states.     
Some BITs tie the FET standard to the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment. In such type of agreements, FET cannot be invoked as a separate standard. What is 
more, the violations of other provisions of the agreement or another agreement do not give rise to 
the breach of FET. Art 6 of both the Canada-Tanzania BIT and Canada-Senegal BIT provides for 
the “Minimum Standard of Treatment” to be accorded to the investments of foreign investors. 
The provisions oblige each party to accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including fair and 
equitable treatment. 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
“where an IIA ties the FET obligation to the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens, the threshold of liability as applied by arbitral tribunals has been generally 
                                                          
28 Dunn Gibson and Crutcher LLP, Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties: What all Dealmakers Need to 
Know (2015), at 2. Available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/Bilateral-and-Multilateral-
Investments-Treaties--What-All-Dealmakers-Need-to-Know.pdf. (Accessed on 11th of November 2016). 
29 Fox, supra note 1, at 233-234. 
30 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, United Nations, New York and Geneva (2012), at 15. 
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higher, i.e. the host state’s conduct needs to be egregious or outrageous.”31 In a similar fashion, 
the tribunal in Pope and Talbot v. Canada ruled that the FET standard was “additive” to the 
international minimum standard of treatment.32 As such, the host state is obliged not to deny 
justice so that the foreign investor acquires adequate protection to her economic rights and 
interests. At the same time, the host state will also be able not to give up its non-economic 
interests. 
2. Expropriation 
In a nutshell, investment rules and regulations do not provide precise definition for the term 
expropriation.33 Generally speaking, expropriation can be of two types: direct and indirect.34 The 
former is made through a formalized expropriation decree or law whereas the latter emanates 
from measures the host state takes to regulate economic activities within its territory, even where 
such regulation is not directly targeted at an investment.35 It has to be clear that not all measures 
of the host State constitute expropriation under international investment law. In other words, 
there are some measures essential to the efficient functioning of the state for which no 
compensation shall be paid like non-discriminatory measures taken for environmental 
protection.36 In the course of imposing any measure for environmental protection, however, the 
host state must take into account its investment treaty obligations. 
Though whether a measure taken by the host State is non-compensable regulatory measure 
or otherwise is to be determined on a case by case analysis in the course of dispute settlement, it 
is important to highlight some criteria that may be taken in to consideration. Basically, the 
purpose of the measure needs to be examined. Accordingly, it is important to make sure that the 
measures are taken for environmental protection. Second, any such measure shall not cause a 
substantial deprivation of the economic interests of the investor. When severe economic impact 
is caused to the foreign investor, the host State may be required to pay compensation. Third, it 
shall not be used as a disguised taking of the investment and shall be non-discriminatory.37 
A broad definition of indirect expropriation, adopted because of lack of precise definition of 
the term, in IIAs may result in a situation where all state measures that harm an investor can be 
considered an indirect expropriation, irrespective of the reasons that underlie any such measure.38 
Accordingly, the determination of the scope of indirect expropriation is a prominently debated 
issue particularly whether or not it includes “measures tantamount to expropriation.” The 
practice of tribunals tends to show that such a phrase includes indirect expropriation. For 
                                                          
31 UNCTAD, supra note 17, at 13. 
32 Pope and Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para. 110. 
33 OECD, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, OECD Working 
Papers on International Investment, No. 2004/04, 2004, at 5. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321. 
accessed on 23rd  of September 2017.  
34 Id.  
35 Suzy H. Nikièma, Indirect Expropriation, Best Practices Series, IISD, 2012, at 1. Available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_practice_indirect_expropriation.pdf. (accessed on 3rd of November 2016).  
36 Id. at 4. 
37 OECD, supra note 33.  
38 Nikiema, supra note 35, at 3. 
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instance, in Tecmed v. Mexico,39 the tribunal held that the failure to renew the operating permit 
had violated Article 5 of the Mexico-Spain BIT, which safeguards investors from expropriation 
or equivalent measures. It recognized that the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or 
not, are an indirect de facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and further noted 
the following: 
Generally, it is understood that the term ‘equivalent to expropriation’ or ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’ included in the Agreement and in other international treaties related to the 
protection of foreign investors refers to the so-called ‘indirect expropriation’ or ‘creeping 
expropriation’, as well as to the de facto expropriation. Although these forms of 
expropriation do not have a clear or unequivocal definition, it is generally understood that 
they materialize through actions or conduct, which do not express the purpose of depriving 
one of rights or assets, but have actually that effect.40 
As most IIAs also prohibit indirect expropriation, which extends to regulatory takings, and as 
some arbitral tribunals have tended to interpret this broadly so that it includes legitimate 
regulatory measures in the pursuit of the public interest, the expropriation clause has the 
potential to pose undue constraints on a State’s regulatory capacity.41 To avoid this, 
policymakers could clarify the notion of indirect expropriation and introduce criteria to 
distinguish between indirect expropriation and legitimate regulation that does not require 
compensation.42 
Some international investment tribunals have found that environmental regulatory measures 
constituted expropriation thereby entailing the liability to pay compensation. For instance, in 
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, the tribunal stated that: 
Expropriatory environmental measures, no matter how laudable and beneficial to society 
as a whole, are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state 
may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for 
environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay 
compensation remains.43 
Some BITs to which developing countries are parties recognize that non-discriminatory 
measures aimed at protecting the environment do not constitute expropriation. In this regard, the 
BIT entered into between India and Senegal44 is a good example. It constitutes an annex for the 
interpretation and clarification of expropriation, which forms an integral part of the BIT. It 
provides that “except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives including health, safety 
                                                          
39 Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 20. 
40 Id. para. 114.  
41 UNCTAD, supra note 17. 
42 Id.  
43 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID, Case No. ARB/96/1, para 72 (2002). 
44 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Senegal 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, (signed 03/07/2008 and entered into force 17/10/2009). Available 
at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1595. (Accessed on 3rd of December 2016). (India-
Senegal BIT hereafter). 
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and the environment concerns do not constitute expropriation or nationalization.”45 Similarly, the 
BIT concluded between Canada and Tanzania BIT46 states that: 
Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so 
severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having 
been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.47 
Accordingly, it is possible for the host State to impose measures to protect the environment 
without the measure constituting indirect expropriation.  
Furthermore, the India-Senegal BIT states that “actions and awards by judicial bodies of a 
Party that are designed, applied or issued in public interest including those designed to address 
health, safety and environmental concerns do not constitute expropriation or nationalization.”48 
Pursuant to the BIT between Turkey and Senegal,49 measures aimed at the protection of the 
environment do not constitute expropriation provided that they are non-discriminatory.50 Thus, 
tribunals need to be cautious of the regulatory measures that host States may take to protect their 
environmental interest and measures that CONSTITUTE INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY SPACE IN IIAS  
Being an integral parts of modern IIAs, environmental stipulation have featured in different 
parts of agreements, from preamble through substantive parts and annexes. As looking into IIAs 
serve as a foundation to evaluate Ethiopian BITs, this section presents how sovereign rights of 
regulating the national environment are coined in IIAs, and its implication and meaning 
(enforceability) when they appear in different parts of an agreement. 
A. Preambles 
The sovereign right to regulate and environmental protection may be expressly recognized in the 
preamble of IIAs. At this juncture, it is vital to consider the role of preambles. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose.51 It goes on saying that the context for the purpose of the 
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
                                                          
45 Id. Annexure 5.1 (3).  
46 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed on 17th May of 2013). Available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/222.  (Accessed on 23rd of January 2017). (Canada-Tanzania 
BIT hereafter). 
47 Id. Art. 10 (5) last para.  
48 India-Senegal BIT, supra note 44, Annexure 5.1 (4). 
49 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of 
Senegal Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Signed on 15 th of June 2015. (Turkey-
Senegal BIT hereafter). 
50 Id. Art 5 (2).  
51 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna on 23rd May of 1969, Art. 31 (1). 
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annexes.52 Thus, preambles could be used in interpretation of treaties both at the text and context 
stage, and at the object and purpose stage. Since the existing BITs primarily focus on the 
protection of investments, tribunals have often relied on preambles to justify expansive 
interpretations of investor protections, where the preambles clearly indicated that the overriding 
objective of the treaty was investment promotion and protection.  
For instance, in SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal relied on the preamble of the applicable 
BIT, i.e. Philippines-Switzerland BIT of 1997, which is intended to create and maintain 
favorable conditions for investments by investors of one contracting party in the territory of the 
other contracting party thereby favoring the investor. The tribunal stated that: 
The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. According 
to the preamble it is intended …to create and maintain favorable conditions for 
investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other…. It is 
legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favor the protection of 
covered investments.53 
The BIT entered into between Finland and Nigeria,54 employs environmental language in its 
preamble. After stipulating the desire to promote and protect international investment, the 
preamble of the agreement recognizes the importance of environmental protection. It provides 
that “these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental 
measures of general application.”55 The preamble to the Canada-Senegal BIT also explicitly 
refers to the promotion of sustainable development.56 It reads “recognizing that the promotion 
and the protection of investments of investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party will 
be conducive to the stimulation of mutually beneficial business activity, to the development of 
economic cooperation between them and to the promotion of sustainable development…”57 
The preamble of the Canada-Tanzania BIT can also be considered as a good example in 
striking the balance between investment protection and sustainable development. It 
acknowledges the Parties’ desire in the following terms:  
Desiring to intensify economic co-operation and promote sustainable development for the 
mutual benefit of both countries…; recognizing that the promotion and reciprocal 
protection of such investments favor the economic prosperity and sustainable development 
The foregoing preambles declare not only the parties’ interest to achieve economic objectives but 
also their desire to reach the objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of the 
environment. This concern for the protection of the environment and other social objectives 
                                                          
52 Id. Art. 31 (2).   
53 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (29 January 2004) para 116. 
54 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 22nd June 2005. (Finland-Nigeria BIT hereafter). 
55 Id.  Preamble; See also the Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 49.  
56 Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, (concluded on 27th November of 2014) (Canada-Senegal BIT hereafter). Available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3240. (Accessed on 15th of February 2017). Art 16  
57 Id.  
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could not be underestimated as it informs tribunals to take care of such non-economic interests in 
the course of interpretation of the BIT.  
The IISD Model Agreement58 introduces the concepts of sustainable development and 
sustainable investment. Some of the expressions employed in its preamble59 are worth due 
attention. To mention few: 
a) The concern for sustainable development in terms of sustainable investment has become 
at the forefront. It has been admitted that the development of the national and global 
economy is possible only through sustainable investment. 
b) Sustainable investment begs for the cooperation between foreign investors, their home 
states and host governments of the concerned investment activity. 
c) The need for balance of rights and obligations in international investment between 
foreign investors, their home states and the host states has become immense. 
d) IIAs are required to reflect the principles of transparency, accountability and legitimacy 
for all participants (investors, home states and host states) of FDI. 
The Indian Model BIT60 has also a room for the notion of sustainable development. It declares 
the Parties’ objective in the following terms: 
Reaffirming the right of Parties to regulate Investments in their territory in accordance with 
their Law and policy objectives including the right to change the conditions applicable to 
such Investments; and seeking to align the objectives of Investment with sustainable 
development and inclusive growth of the Parties.61 
In addition to its adoption of the principle of sustainable development, the Indian Model 
acknowledges the parties’ right to regulate the investment and to exercise flexibility with respect 
to the conditions applicable to such investments. 
B. Substantive provisions 
When BITs do not create express exceptions from the obligations contained therein, they might 
nonetheless expressly mention the noninvestment obligations of the contracting parties, in 
balancing clauses.62 The new generation of BITs has seen the multiplication of this kind of 
clauses, which can take different forms and express different levels of commitment to non-
investment obligations.63 In this regard, it is vital to consider some BITs to which developing 
countries are Parties. For instance, the BITs concluded between Canada and Tanzania64 as well 
as that of Canada and Senegal65 contains a provision on “Health, Safety and Environmental 
                                                          
58 Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., IISD Model International Agreement on Investment (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf, (accessed on 23rd of January 2017).   
59 Id. preamble.  
60 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, (Indian Model BIT hereafter), Available at 
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20I
nvestment%20Treaty.pdf. (Accessed on 7th of November 2016). 
61 Id. preamble.  
62 Alessandra Asteriti, Greening Investment Law, PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, (2011), at 144. Also 
available at http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2813/. (accessed on 15th December of 2016). 
63 Id.  
64 Canada-Tanzania BIT, supra note 46. 
65 Canada-Senegal BIT, supra note 56, Art. 15. 
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Measures” which states that “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures”.66 
The SADC Model BIT67 enshrines sustainable development concerns both under its 
preamble and substantive provisions. The Model BIT provides for options the parties can resort 
to in the course of drafting their investment agreements. In the preamble, the need to promote 
investment opportunities that enhance sustainable development is acknowledged. It also 
recognizes the right to regulate investment in explicit terms.68 According to Art. 1 of the SADC 
Model, the objective of an investment agreement shall be to encourage and increase investments 
that support the sustainable development of each party.69 With respect to FET, the SADC Model 
optionally refers to customary international law. It states that “each State Party shall accord to 
Investments or Investors of the other State Party FET in accordance with customary international 
law on the treatment of aliens”.70 
Pursuant to Art. 6.7 of the SADC Model, a non-discriminatory measure of a state party that 
is designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety and the environment, does not constitute an indirect expropriation under this 
Agreement. The Model further requires investors to comply with environmental impact 
assessment under its Art. 13. Art. 14 (1) of the Model also requires investments to implement a 
system of environmental management in light of available international environmental 
management standards. By virtue of Art. 14 (2) of the Model, such environmental management 
system has to be improved and updated regularly. More importantly, the SADC Model requires 
“investors and their investments not to establish manage or operate investments in a manner 
inconsistent with international environmental, labor, and human rights obligations binding on the 
host State or the home State, whichever obligations are higher.”71 Art. 22 of the Model provide 
that each state party is permitted to adopt its own environmental standards and to modify such 
standards where the need arises. 
The IISD’s model multilateral investment agreement attempts to change the prevailing 
structure of investment treaties to specifically introduce development objectives into them.72 The 
IISD model agreement achieves this by creating both rights and obligations for investors and 
host countries. The Model was designed in such a way that the protections for investors are 
                                                          
66 Canada-Tanzania BIT, supra note 46, Art. 15. 
67 SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary, 2012. (SADC Model hereafter). 
Available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf. (Accessed on 
19th of February 2017). 
68 Art. 20.1 of the SADC Model reads: ‘In accordance with customary international law and other general 
principles of international law, the Host State has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that 
development in its territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and with other 
legitimate social and economic policy objectives.’ 
69 Id. Art. 1.  
70 Id. Art. 5, Option 1. The second option refers to ‘fair administrative treatment.’  
71 Id. Art. 15.3.  
72 Jennifer Maul and Kate Vyborny, Globalization, International Law and the Future of International Investment 
Treaties, An Introductory Workshop on the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
at 1. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/IISD.pdf. (Accessed on 3rd of December 2016). 
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conditioned upon minimum responsibilities, including conducting environmental impact 
assessments.73 Art. 12 of the Model requires foreign investors or their investments to undergo 
environmental or social impact assessments prior to the establishment of the investment in 
accordance with the laws of the host state. Similarly, Art. 14 impose post-establishment 
obligations on foreign investors to maintain environmental management system and standard. 
Furthermore, Art. 20 provides that it is inappropriate for the parties to attract foreign investment 
through the adoption of lax environmental and other standards. More specifically, Art. 21 (1) of 
the Model calls for high levels of environmental protection. By so doing, the model seeks a 
balance between rights and obligations for investors, host states, and home states. The agreement 
affirms the inherent right of governments to regulate foreign investment in the public interest and 
to articulate their own development policy.74 
Art. 7 of the IISD Model entitled “Minimum international standards” provides that “each 
Party shall accord to investors or their investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security and such 
obligation is to be understood as consistent with the obligation of host states.”75 Furthermore, the 
preceding sub-paragraph is said to prescribe the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments.76 It 
goes on saying that the concepts of FET and full protection and security are included within this 
standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.77 
The provision of the IISD Model on expropriation reiterates that regulatory measures may 
not be considered as expropriation.78 The IISD Model, under its Article 8 (I), stipulates that non-
discriminatory regulatory measures taken by a party that are designed and applied to protect or 
enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not 
constitute an indirect expropriation. Such measures, nevertheless, are required to be in 
consistency with the right of states to regulate and the customary international law principles on 
police powers.   
Under Art. 10.6 (ix) of the Indian Model, foreign investors and investments are duty bound 
to develop and comply with policies to ensure timely and accurate disclosure of material 
information relating to environmental impacts and management systems. This obligation persists 
even in the absence of such obligation under the laws and regulations of the host state. 
Furthermore, investors and their investment are obliged to comply with the environmental laws 
of the host State applicable to the concerned investment by virtue of Art. 12.1 (iii) of the same 
Model. 
                                                          
73 Luke E. Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties- Implications for Sustainable Development and Options for 
Regulation, FES Conference Report (2007), at 2. Available at http://www.fes-
globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf. (Accessed on 15th of 
January 2017). 
74 Id.   
75 IISD Model, supra note 58, Art. 7 (A). 
76 Id. Art. 7 (B).  
77 Id.  
78 Id. Art. 8 (I).  
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C. Exceptions 
An environmental exception clause is a general provision that excuses governments from treaty 
obligations where the challenged measures were taken for environmental purposes.79 Exceptions 
can be inserted in IIAs in two ways- general and specific. General exceptions permit the Parties 
to the agreement to derogate from all of their obligations provided that certain requirements are 
satisfied. Specific exceptions, on the other hand, are aimed at preventing the application of 
specific obligations, such as those arising from expropriation clause. 
Many countries have included general exceptions for measures taken to protect 
environmental interests in treaty texts. These express carve-outs allow the parties to adopt 
necessary measures to protect human, animal and plant life or health as well as for conserving 
natural resources and ensure that environmental policies are not watered down to attract more 
investments.80 A good example of the general exceptions is the BIT concluded between Egypt 
and Canada.81 Under Art XVII of the BIT, general exceptions to the application of the agreement 
are recognized. The relevant part of the provision reads “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”82 It goes 
on saying that: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting 
or maintaining measures, including environmental measures: (b) necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; or (c) relating to the conservation of living or non-
living exhaustible natural resources83 
The foregoing provision is almost similar to the general exception recognized under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).84 Despite its exceptional recognition for natural 
resource conservation and protection of the environment, the dispute settlement organs of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime constructed this exception narrowly.85 The 
effectiveness of the environmental general exception under the international trade regime is 
complicated by the range of interpretations concerning Article XX of the GATT that have been 
                                                          
79 Meredith Wilensky, Reconciling International Investment Law and Climate Change Policy: Potential Liability 
for Climate Measures under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 45 ELR 10684 (2015) at 11. 
80 Francesca R. Jacur, Changing Climate in Climate Change Investment; An International Law Perspective, at 
14-15, Available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_071568.pdf. (Accessed on 12th of 
February 2017).  
81 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, concluded on 13th of November 1996). (Egypt-Canada BIT hereafter).  
82 Id. Art XVII (2).  
83 Id. Art XVII (3).  
84 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1A to the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in World Trade Organization, The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: WTO, 1995), Art. XX (b and g). 
85 Jonathan M. Harris, Trade and the Environment, Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts 
University (2004) at 12. 
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issued by several GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels.86 However, the possibility of ensuring 
environmental protection, at least to some extent, cannot be ruled out.  
With a slight difference from the preceding paragraph, the BIT signed between India and 
Senegal87 provides for a “General and Security Exceptions” which encompasses measures for 
public health reasons or to prevent diseases affecting animals and plants.88 Furthermore, Art. 16 
of the Indian Model BIT provides that nothing in this Treaty  precludes the host state from taking 
actions or measures of general applicability which it considers necessary with respect to the 
protection and conservation of the environment including all living and non-living natural 
resources.89 Though ‘exceptions’ are more difficult to prove than ‘principles,’ which are positive 
rules that establish parallel rights and obligations for the concerned parties, they can still serve as 
one of the approaches used to incorporate environment-friendly provisions in BITs.   
D. Separate side agreements 
Apart from or in addition to the recognition of environmental-friendly provisions in BITs, it is 
also possible to adopt a separate side agreement to protect the environment. This approach makes 
it easy to come-up with all necessary details towards environmental objectives. A good example 
in this regard is the NAFTA Side Agreement90 signed by NAFTA member countries. Even if it is 
not a BIT, NAFTA regulates investment activities under its Chapter Eleven and the side 
agreement concluded under its ambit can be taken as a good practice. 
IV. STOCKTAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION UNDER ETHIOPIA’S BITS 
Evidences show that there are multiples of ways for exercising the sovereignty right of 
regulating environmental by host states. They have done that without adversely affecting other 
investment interests within the frameworks of BITs. Against such backgrounds, this section 
critically evaluates the extent to which Ethiopia’s BITs empower the state and oblige investors of 
their environmental duties. Accordingly, examination of different sections of the signed BITs 
and new developments are analyzed. 
A. Preambles 
The Ethiopia-Turkey BIT was concluded on 16th November 2000.91 Before proceeding with its 
substantive contents, it is vital to start by examining its preamble which stipulates: 
                                                          
86 Douglas J. Caldwell, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT/WTO Regime, Discussion Draft, 
1998, at 13. 
87 India-Senegal BIT, supra note 44. 
88 Id. Art. 13.  
89 Indian Model BIT, supra note 60, Art. 16.1 (v). 
90 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between  the Government Of Canada, The 
Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/Environ.asp. (Accessed on 17th of November 2016).  
91 Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia concerning the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, (concluded on 16th of November 2000). (The Ethiopia-Turkey 
BIT). 
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Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, particularly with respect 
to investment by investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party; …; Agreeing that 
FET of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and 
maximum effective utilization of economic resources.92 
The Ethiopia-China BIT93 was meant to create favorable conditions for the investment activities 
and to bring economic prosperity as envisaged from the following terms:  
Intending to create favorable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party; Recognizing that the reciprocal 
encouragement, promotion and protection of such investments will be conducive to 
stimulating business initiative of the investors and will increase prosperity in both States.94  
From the very outset, the Parties’ foremost objective is to create favorable conditions for the 
investment activity of investors of one contracting Party in the territory of the other contracting 
Party. This objective, on its face, is sound as it creates a safe business environment for the 
investors of both Parties. The next paragraph enshrines two things: stimulating business initiative 
of the investors and an increment of prosperity in both States. This paragraph seems to have been 
constructed on the belief that investment activities by themselves could ensure prosperity. The 
preamble also strives to intensify economic cooperation. A close look at the foregoing preamble 
illustrates the Parties’ sole interest to encourage investment activities. No single word is inserted, 
which recognizes other non-economic interests of the contracting Parties including the need to 
protect the environment.  
The Ethiopia-France BIT95 was concluded on 25th June 2003. To start with its preamble, it 
aims at creating favorable conditions for investments by the investors of one contracting Party in 
the territory of the other contracting Party. It reads: 
Desiring to strengthen the economic cooperation between both States and to create 
favorable conditions for French investments in Ethiopia and Ethiopian investments in 
France, Convinced that the promotion and protection of these investments would succeed 
in stimulating transfers of capital and technology between the two countries in the interest 
of their economic development96 
This preamble also lacks the regulatory space through which states could impose measures to 
protect the environment.  
                                                          
92 Id. preamble.  
93 Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of 
the People's Republic of China concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Signed on 
11 May 1998 and entered into force on 1 May 2000. (Ethiopia-China BIT hereafter). 
94 Id. preamble.  
95Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic 
of France for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, (concluded on 25 th of June 2003). (Ethiopia-
France BIT). 
96 Id. preamble.  
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The Ethiopia-Sudan BIT97 was signed on 7 March 2000 and entered into force on 15 May 
2001. Just like other BITs to which Ethiopia is a Party, the preamble of the BIT focuses on the 
sole aim of protecting foreign investments. It reads: 
Desiring to strengthen their traditional ties of friendship and to extend and intensify the 
economic relation between them and in particular to create favorable conditions for 
investments by Investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party; Recognizing the need to protect investments by Investors of the Contracting Parties 
and to stimulate the flow of investments and individual business initiative with the view of 
promoting the economic prosperity of the Contracting Parties;  
The currently effective BIT between Ethiopia and Germany was concluded on 19 January 
2004.98 This BIT, in its preamble, declares the intention of the Parties to cooperate in promotion 
and protection of investments in the following terms:  
Desiring to intensify economic co-operation between both States; intending to create 
favorable conditions for investments by investors of either State in the territory of the other 
State; recognizing that the encouragement and contractual protection of such investments 
are apt to stimulate private business initiative and to increase the prosperity of both 
nations. 
Just like other BITs of Ethiopia, the preamble to this BIT focuses on the protection and 
promotion of investments and it does not reflect the need to protect the environment. The 
following subsection also presents that the BITs of Ethiopia are means by which foreign 
investors maximize their interests. 
B. Duty to promote and protect investment 
Generally speaking, Ethiopian BITs lack provisions that impose parallel obligations on investors 
with respect to environmental protection. In the absence of such provisions in BITs, a resort to 
only domestic environmental rules and regulations may not effectively address environmental 
concerns. This is attributable to two reasons. First, the protection offered to investors may limit 
the ability of governments to regulate investment for the protection of the environment, natural 
resources and other social goods, and to ensure that foreign investment contributes to overall 
national development goals.99 Any attempt by the host state to impose measures for 
environmental protection could result in the violation of its obligations under BITs. Second, by 
virtue of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states are precluded from invoking their 
domestic laws as a defense for the breach of their treaty obligations.100 As such, for the host 
state’s environmental measure to be justifiable without constituting treaty violation, the measure 
                                                          
97 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of 
the Republic of the Sudan on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, (concluded on 7 th March of 
2000). (The Ethiopia-Sudan BIT). 
98 See Treaty between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Germany 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, (concluded on 19 th January of 2004). (The 
Ethiopia-Germany BIT). 
99 Livia Costanza, The Security of International Investments – A Synthesis of Impacts on Public Policies and 
Domestic Laws of Host States, LL.M Dissertation, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 2009, at 66. 
100 Vienna Convention, supra note 51, Art. 27. 
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must first get an equal status with the obligation to protect and promote foreign investment under 
the applicable treaty.    
Under the BITs of Ethiopia, the Parties’ conviction of promotion and protection of 
investments is further elaborated under the substantive provisions of the BITs. At this juncture, it 
is vital to examine the implications of a heavy reliance on attracting, promoting and protecting 
foreign investment. Basically, it is important for every State to promote and protect investment 
so as to comply with its investment treaty obligations. The question, however, is what kind of 
investments deserve protection? Or could States be better-off by protecting all investments 
whatsoever? These questions are relevant because there are some investments which are 
irresponsible to the society and the environment in which they operate. Thus, States should 
protect quality investments that are responsible for each and every of their activities. This takes 
us to a third question which asks how should the duty to promote and protect investment appear 
in BITs. The answer is clear: BITs should not promote and protect investments in generic terms 
but only those responsible to the society and the environment. 
According to Art. 2 of the Ethiopia-Turkey BIT, each Party assumed the obligation to 
encourage and create favorable conditions for investors of the other Party to invest in its 
territory.101 By the same token, the substantive part of the BIT also focuses only on the 
protections of the investors and their investments. For instance, the provision on the promotion 
of investments obliges the Parties to encourage investors to make investments and to grant all 
sorts of assistance with respect to activities associated with such investments.102 Contrary to the 
normal BITs practice, the Ethiopia-Belgian-Luxembourg BIT, which has not entered into force 
yet, introduces environmental measures under its Art. 5. 
The Ethiopia-France BIT enshrines the duty of the parties to promote investment. Article 2 
provides that each contracting party shall encourage and admit on its territory and in its maritime 
area, investments made by nationals or companies of the other contracting party. What is more, 
under the Ethiopia-Sudan BIT, the Parties are duty bound to encourage and create favorable 
conditions for investors of the other contracting Party103 and to grant the necessary permit needed 
for the investment.104 The Ethiopia-Germany BIT also follows the same stance. Article 2 of the 
BIT is another indication of the Parties commitment to focus solely on economic objectives. It 
provides that “each Contracting Party shall within the framework of its policies in its territory 
promote investments by investors of the other Contracting Party and admit such investments in 
accordance with its legislation.”105 In this regard, most BITs of Ethiopia talk similar language. 
They tend to maximize the interests of foreign investors by providing for various obligations on 
the country.  
                                                          
101 Ethiopia-Turkey BIT, supra note 91, Art. 2 (1). 
102 Ethiopia-China BIT, supra note 93, Art. 2. 
103 Ethiopia-Sudan BIT, supra note 97, Art. 2 (1). 
104 Id. Art. 2 (2).  
105 Ethiopia-Germany BIT, supra note 98, Art. 2 (1). 
Wakgari,   ETHIOPIA’S BITS IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 85 
 
 
C. Standards of Treatment 
Ethiopia’s BITs provide for different types of standards of treatment to be afforded to foreign 
investors and their investments. One of such standards of protection is the FET. With the 
exception of the Ethiopia-United Arab Emirates BIT, which has not entered into force yet, the 
remaining BITs of the country recognize the FET principle. Not surprisingly, in some cases, the 
BITs stipulate the FET as their very objective in their preamble in addition to the substantive 
provisions.106 
Out of the effective BITs of Ethiopia covered under this article, only the one concluded with 
France recognizes a qualified FET.107 Basically, FET can be qualified by reference to 
international law (this is the stance taken by the Ethiopia-France BIT), by listing FET elements 
(making exhaustive or illustrative lists) and by incorporation of FET modifiers like, for instance, 
combining with NT and MFN. 
The Ethiopia-Turkey BIT provides that investments of investors of the other contracting 
party shall at all times be accorded FET and shall enjoy full protection in the territory of the 
other contracting party.108 It is nowhere clear as to what amounts to the breach of this obligation. 
In addition, the provision is not clear whether this protection is self-containing or dependent on 
the international minimum standard of treatment.  
Art. 3 of the Ethiopia-China BIT, on its part, provides for the standards of treatment to be 
accorded to investments. Accordingly, the Parties are duty bound to extend FET to the 
investments and associated activities of the investors. It goes on saying that investments and 
activities associated with investments of investors of either party shall be accorded FET and shall 
enjoy protection in the territory of the other party.109 
What makes the FET under the Ethiopia-China BIT different is that the Ethiopia-China BIT 
uses a broad language which extends to activities associated with investments. As it is difficult to 
ascertain such related activities, it is more likely that foreign investors argue on the basis of this 
provision to attack all measures of host states. 
Article 3 of the Ethiopia-Sudan BIT prescribes the necessary standards of treatment. Hence, 
parties shall accord to the investments of investors from the other contracting party full 
protection, non-discriminatory, NT and FET. It stipulates that each contracting party shall ensure 
FET within its territory to investments and investors of the other contracting party and shall not 
be less favorable than that accorded to investments made by its own investors or investors of any 
third states. 
Furthermore, with respect to the FET principle, the Ethiopia-Germany BIT acknowledges 
that each contracting party shall in its territory in any case accord investments by investors of the 
                                                          
106 See e.g. Ethiopia’s BIT concluded with Denmark, preamble and Art. 3 (1). 
107 The BITs Ethiopia concluded with Finland, Germany, Iran, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen recognize unqualified FET. Consequently, 
the FET under these BITs is vulnerable to a broad interpretation with the possibility of zeroing policy space.   
108 Ethiopia-Turkey BIT, supra note 91, Art. 2 (2). 
109 Ethiopia-China BIT, supra note 93, Art. 3(1). 
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other contracting party FET as well as full protection under the Treaty.110 Rather than providing 
for the FET, the provision, just like other BITs, is not clear as to what constitutes FET.  
D. Expropriation 
Concerning expropriation, some BITs of Ethiopia explicitly recognize the direct-indirect 
expropriation classification..111 Others employ equivalent terms or phrases such as “expropriate, 
nationalize or take similar measures”, “other measures having the same nature or the same 
effect” and “subjected to any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to 
expropriation”.112 These latter terminologies connote indirect expropriation. Not surprisingly, all 
the BITs require that indirect expropriation, too, must be compensated. Indirect expropriation 
includes regulatory measures that harm, affect or interfere with the investment to such a degree 
that they effectively take the investors' property even if the investors still technically retain 
ownership.113 Thus, environmental regulation could fall in the ambit of such phrases thereby 
entailing liability. 
The Ethiopia-Turkey BIT connotes that investments shall not be expropriated, nationalized 
or subject, directly or indirectly, to measures of similar effects except for a public purpose, in a 
non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and 
in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of treatment provided for in the 
Article III of this Agreement.114 It lacks a language that excludes regulatory measures taken for 
environmental protection from constituting indirect expropriation. 
The expropriation provision of the Ethiopia-China BIT lacks adequate policy space to 
regulate in the interests of the society and the environment without paying compensation to the 
foreign investors. It stipulates that neither party shall expropriate, nationalize or take similar 
measures against investments of investors of the other party in its territory, unless it is for the 
public interests; under domestic legal procedure; without discrimination and against 
compensation.115 It is important to note here that the host state may expropriate foreign 
investments provided that it is for public interest and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. In other words, although environmental concerns may constitute public interest in 
this scenario, environmental measures may not be imposed in the absence of compensation. This 
needs to be compared to the provisions of some BITs which enable the host state to adopt 
environmental regulatory measures without effecting compensation to the foreign investors. 
Article 5 of the Ethiopia-France BIT entitled “Dispossession and Indemnification” 
recognizes privilege against expropriation. With respect to expropriation, it states that “Neither 
Contracting Party shall take any measures of expropriation or nationalization or any other 
                                                          
110 Ethiopia-Germany BIT, supra note 98, Art. 2 (2). 
111 E.g. Ethiopia-Turkey BIT, supra note 91; Ethiopia-France BIT, supra note 95. 
112 E.g. The BITs Ethiopia concluded with China, Sudan and Germany. 
113 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson, Belgium’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: A review, 
Draft for Discussion (2010) at 15. Also available at http://www.iisd.org. (Accessed on 11th of February 2017).  
114 Ethiopia-Turkey BIT, supra note 91, Art. 4 (1). 
115 Ethiopia-China BIT, supra note 93, Art. 4(1). 
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measures having the effect of dispossession, direct or indirect.”116 What makes the Ethiopia-
France BIT different from others in this regard is that it introduces a “More Favorable 
Provisions” that could prevail over the BIT. Article 7 of the BIT provides that investments made 
by nationals or companies of one contracting party having formed the subject of a particular 
commitment from the other contracting party, according to its legislation, to a specific contract, 
or to any other form of agreement, shall be governed, without prejudice to the provisions of this 
Agreement, by the terms of this said commitment if the latter includes provisions more favorable 
than those of this Agreement.  
Article 4 of the Ethiopia-Sudan BIT provides that neither contracting party shall take any 
measures of expropriation, nationalization or any other measures having the same nature or the 
same effect against investments of Investors of the other Contracting Party unless some 
requirements are satisfied. The Ethiopia-Germany BIT recognizes both direct and indirect 
expropriation. The relevant part of the provision on expropriation states that investments by 
investors of either Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any 
other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization in the 
territory of the other contracting party.117 The way indirect expropriation is inculcated in this 
provision may overwhelm measures taken for the protection of the environment.  
At this juncture, it is important to note that expropriation is a sovereign right of the host 
State when the conditions prescribed in the appropriate legal frameworks is satisfied like the 
existence of public purpose, non-discrimination, prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
The public purpose criterion here is not to mean that regulatory environmental measures should 
result in the obligation of the host State to pay compensation. This is because not all regulatory 
measures constitute expropriation and there must be a room for police power. If the host State is 
required to pay compensation for each and every measure taken to protect its environment, the 
law itself would defeat its purpose. Thus, expropriation should start to count only where the 
environmental regulatory measures go beyond their objectives and cause substantial deprivation 
of the rights of the investor. 
E. The Possibility of Reforming Ethiopia’s BITs 
1. Amendment, Termination and Renegotiation 
Amendment is one of the ways via which the BITs can be reformed. The Parties may amend the 
provisions of BITs to incorporate environment-friendly provisions. Unfortunately, only very few 
BITs of Ethiopia permit amendment. Under the BITs of the country concluded with Algeria (Art. 
11), Denmark (Art. 13), Malaysia (Art. 11), Turkey (Art. 9 (3)), amendment is permitted by the 
mutual consent of the Parties and in writing.  In a somewhat different language, Art. 11 of the 
Ethiopia-Malaysia BIT provides that amendment by mutual consent is possible without prejudice 
to the rights and obligations arising from the BIT prior to the date of such alteration or 
modification until such rights and obligations are fully implemented. On the other hand, the BITs 
                                                          
116 Ethiopia-France BIT, supra note 95, Art. 5 (2). 
117 Ethiopia-Germany BIT, supra note 98, Art. 4 (2). 
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Ethiopia signed with Austria, China, Finland, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, 
Netherlands, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia and Yemen do not permit amendment to the 
agreements.  
Termination of BITs is the other means by which the Parties reconcile the discrepancy 
between economic and non-economic objectives. However, a State could be better-off where 
termination is followed by renegotiation to introduce new generation of BITs. Practice envisages 
that countries have terminated BITs to minimize the unnecessary effects of such agreements. 
According to UNCTAD, at least 110 BITs were renegotiated by the end of 2006.118 For instance, 
in 2005, China renegotiated BITs with Belgium Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Slovakia and Spain, while Germany renegotiated BITs with Egypt and Yemen.119 It has to be 
noted at this point that the termination of BITs could differ from the termination of other treaties. 
For instance, it is not easy to terminate BITs before the date of their expiry.  By the same token, 
the Ethiopian BITs stipulate that the agreements will remain effective for certain fixed period of 
time like ten,120 fifteen,121 twenty122 or thirty123 years.  Once the initial period is over, either of 
the contracting parties may cause termination upon giving written notice to the other party. Upon 
termination, prior investments will receive protection under the terminated BIT for additional 
period of time.124 
2.  Recent Developments: the Draft Model BIT of Ethiopia and the Ethiopia-United 
Arab Emirates BIT 
Currently, there is an attempt to adopt a model BIT125 which incorporates the notion of 
sustainable development. More specifically, it explicitly refers to environmental protection and 
also acknowledges the need to promote corporate social responsibility. The preamble of the draft 
model adopts the need to promote and protect investment on the one hand and the need to protect 
the environment on the other.  
                                                          
118 UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, United Nations, New 
York and Geneva, 2007, at 3. Available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf. (Accessed on 25th of 
February 2017).  
119 Id.    
120 See BITs of Ethiopia signed with Algeria (Art. 11 para. 2), Austria (Art. 25 (2)), Belgian-Luxembourg (Art. 
14 (1)), China (Art. 13 (1)), Denmark (Art. 16 (1)), Germany (Art. 12 (2)), India (Art. 15 (1)), Iran (Art. 14 (1)), 
Israel (Art. 14), Libya (Art. 12 (1)), Malaysia (Art. 12 (2)), Spain (Art. 13 (2)), Sudan (Art. 11 (1)), Switzerland 
(Art. 11 (1)), Tunisia (Art. 12), Turkey (Art. IX (1), United Kingdom (Art. 15 (1)) and Yemen (Art. 11 (1)). 
121 See Art. 14 (1) of the Ethiopia-Netherlands BIT, Art. 12 (2) of the Ethiopia-Russia BIT and Art. 12 (2) of the 
Ethiopia-South Africa BIT which provide that the agreements shall be effective for the period of fifteen years. 
122 See BITs of Ethiopia signed with Finland (Art. 17 (2)), France (Art. 12 para. 2), Sweden (Art. 11 (2)).  
123 For instance, the relevant part of Art. 15 (1) of the Ethiopia-Kuwait reads: This Agreement shall remain in 
force for a period of thirty (30) years and shall continue in force for similar period or periods…” 
124 For instance, pursuant to Art. IX (2) of the Ethiopia-Turkey BIT, Art. 13 (4) of the Ethiopia-China BIT and 
Art. 11 (3) of the Ethiopia-Sudan BIT, the treaties shall remain in force for additional period of ten years in respect 
of investments made or acquired prior to the date of termination. Similarly, under Art. 12 (3) of the Ethiopia-
Germany BIT and Art. 12 paragraph 3 of the Ethiopia-France BIT, prior investments will receive protection under 
the terminated BITs for additional period of fifteen and twenty years, respectively.  
125Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of 
the for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, draft (unpublished), 2016, accessed from the 
Ethiopian Investment Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
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The NT provisions of the draft model also introduce some qualifications. For instance, Art. 4 
(4) provides that the extension of financial assistance or measures taken by a Contracting Party 
in favor of its investors and their investments in pursuit of legitimate public purpose including 
the protection of public health, safety and the environment shall not be considered as a breach of 
NT. In addition, the draft provides for environmental exception to the MFN treatment. 
Accordingly, any non-discriminatory regulatory measure taken by a Party to protect or enhance 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, does not 
constitute a breach of the MFN treatment.126 The draft model also omits the FET obligation. This 
will enable to take regulatory measures for environmental protection whenever necessary. The 
expropriation provision acknowledges that measures taken to safeguard the environment shall 
not constitute indirect expropriation.127 
What is more, a separate provision is adopted concerning environmental protection under 
the draft model. Pursuant to Art. 14 of the draft, Ethiopia as a host State of a foreign investor has 
wide regulatory space that permits the regulation of FDI. It recognizes the right to adopt one’s 
own standard of environmental protection policy and to freely modify such standards when 
desired without the fear violating FET and indirect expropriation provisions. More importantly, 
any alleged violation of the provision on the environment (Art. 14) shall not be subjected to the 
dispute settlement provision of the draft model BIT.128 This shows the country’s need not to take 
away the adjudicatory power concerning disputes involving environmental measures from 
domestic judicial organs. 
Recently, Ethiopia concluded a BIT with the United Arab Emirates on 3rd of December 
2016. The BIT recognizes the interests of the host country in terms of environmental protection 
and sustainable development. Its preamble attempts to reconcile problems related to investment 
protection on the one hand and police powers on the other. In addition, it omits FET standard. 
Furthermore, Art. 11 (2) of the BIT obliges investors and their investments to contribute to the 
development objectives of the host State and to the benefit of the local community in which the 
investment is made. The BIT acknowledges the need to protect the environment under its Art. 
12. Accordingly, the host State can adopt, modify and implement environment-friendly laws and 
policies without transgressing its obligations to protect investment. Unfortunately, this BIT has 
not entered into force yet. 
V. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD 
In sum, Ethiopian BITs have no adequate regulatory space to protect the environment. It is 
only under the Ethiopia-France BIT that a general right to regulate is recognized with no specific 
reference to the environment. There are also some other BITs which make a specific reference to 
                                                          
126Id. Art. 6 (1). 
127Id, Art. 8 (4). This provision is a verbatim copy of Annex B, Art. 13 (1) (c) of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT.  
128 By virtue of Art. 17 of the Model BIT, disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party shall, first, be submitted to amicable settlement. If the dispute has not been settled amicably 
within six months from the date of request, the investor shall institute a claim before a competent domestic court or 
administrative tribunal of the host State. After exhausting all available local remedies, the investor may resort to 
international arbitration.  
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environmental regulatory measures. The Ethiopia-Finland BIT enshrines the need to protect the 
environment only in its preamble. The Ethiopia-Belgian-Luxembourg BIT, which has not 
entered into force yet, incorporates a separate provision for environmental protection in its 
substantive part. Furthermore, the Ethiopia-United Arab Emirates BIT adopts environmental 
protection both in its preamble and substantive parts. Save for these few scenarios, the preambles 
of Ethiopia’s BITs are mute on the right to regulate in general and on environmental issues in 
particular. 
Except the Ethiopia-France BIT which recognizes a FET qualified by reference to 
international law, the remaining effective BITs of Ethiopia adopted unqualified FET. 
Accordingly, such unqualified FET is open to broad interpretation with the possibility of 
nullifying policy space of the host State. In addition, the expropriation provisions of Ethiopia’s 
BITs are not defined and have no carve-outs which preclude environmental measures from 
constituting indirect expropriation.   
There is no a single formula for inserting environmental clauses in investment agreements. 
Instead, a holistic approach i.e. a reference in the preamble, main text, annex or separate 
agreement could produce a better result. With that said, Ethiopian BITs should recognize the 
protection of the environment as its objective and must also reflect the right of the States to 
regulate environmental matters. The BITs must also be capable of ensuring the continuing duty 
of States to promote and enforce environmental protection measures. It has to be noted that 
environmental issues will be fully addressed when all States cooperate avoid the race to the 
bottom. To introduce a bottom-up approach, it is important that the concerned government office 
of Ethiopia develop a model BIT that guides the negotiations and renegotiations.  So as to 
introduce new generation of BITs, it is advisable to amend or terminate the existing BITs of 
Ethiopia that lack room for the regulatory power of the state. 
This should be indicated in different parts of BITs. Accordingly, the preambles to the BITs 
of the country shall be restructured in a way that acknowledges the Parties’ interest to ensure 
sustainable development through environmental protection. This has to be followed by inserting 
explicit obligations on foreign investors and the host State to protect the environment in BITs. 
The BITs of Ethiopia must also eliminate FET standard of protection. In addition, the BITs must 
incorporate provisions that explicitly exclude measures taken for the purpose of environmental 
protection from constituting indirect expropriation. That way, our BITs can serve as a means of 
striking the balance between private gain and public loss.  
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